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Abstract 
This paper aims to highlight the impact of democratization on wasta by examining the 
everyday performance of wasta, or the use of connections and informal networks to acquire 
services. Despite its widespread use, I find that it is understudied as an explanatory variable in 
the literature on democratization and authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, 
with Tunisia as a case study. In this paper, I argue that wasta can potentially have a 
consolidating effect on regimes. I examine the ways that wasta is encoded in everyday 
language. Using literature from Pragmatics, specifically Goffman’s dramaturgical model, I find 
that Tunisians’ discursive world view reveals the power dynamics that underly the performance 
of wasta. I close with a research agenda that examines common approaches to studying wasta 
and how they can be improved by integrating an ethnographic lens.
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SNFSI: National Syndicate of Internal Security Forces 
UNDP: United Nations Development Program 
 
 
1 As is common in Tunisia and the Maghreb in general, institutions are often referred to by their French 
acronyms. 
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Part One 
Introduction 
He who gave his word to someone, also gave them his life.2  
Do like your neighbor or move out.3  
Tunisian proverbs 
In late December 2010, the Tunisian people toppled a 23-year regime who had made 
any form of dissent, private or public, exceedingly dangerous. Strict censorship governed 
public spaces, with complex structures put in place to control literary production, the media, 
and other realms of life. In other words, collective imagination was tightly surveilled and 
policed4. However, the large-scale protests that broke out in late December saw thousands 
of people take to the street and defy police violence to demand “dignity, freedom, social 
justice”5. Eight years later, Tunisia’s democratic transition became one of its biggest selling 
points: successful election of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) that passed a new 
constitution considered the most progressive in the region, free and fair democratic elections 
of a president and a parliament, and the country’s first ever local elections of municipal 
councils in each of the country’s 24 governorates6. However, how much has really changed 
in people’s everyday lives? Of the everyday processes that have survived the democratic 
2 Original: إللّي عطا كلمتو عطا رقبتو. 
3 Original: أعِمْل كيف جارك وإال حول باب دارك. 
4 This paper’s main case study is Tunisia, which is my only country of citizenship and where I lived until 2017. 
My own experiences with authoritarianism, wasta, and protests will heavily inform my knowledge of this case 
study. 
5 Many of their chants were then picked up by other states in the region, becoming emblems of freedom of 
speech. 
6 Municipal Council members used to be appointed rather than elected. 
2 
overhaul, what can their study tell us about the opportunities and obstacles that social 
movements are faced with in the future?  
‘willis from tunis’ [sic] is the nom de plume of Tunisian cartoonist Nadia Khiari 
whose political satire has become popular ever since the first 2011 protests broke out. Her 
protagonist, Willis “The Cat of the Revolution” (Grillmeier 2018) is a humanoid character 
that the artist uses to voice her critique of authoritarianism, social inequality, and political 
absurdities. One of Khiari’s recent cartoons is worth examining as it nicely informs the rest 
of this paper.  
The October 2018 piece has two scenes (willis from tunis 2018). The first reveals 
Willis, paws in the air and lips tightly muffling a cry as a tear escapes his eye and a 
policeman’s black boot pins his head to the ground with the caption “Avant la révolution, c’était 
ça” (“Before the Revolution, we had this”). The same scene is repeated again, except this 
time around Willis is crying audibly in pain, “Aaaaïïïe” under the caption “Mais aujourd’hui, 
heureusement, on a la liberté d’expression !” (“But luckily today we have freedom of expression!”). 
This visual representation juxtaposes change and continuity to reveal a striking reality about 
life in Tunisia after the political transition: newfound freedoms, like freedom of expression 
and freedom to protest, but within an immutable police state.  
3 
There have been constant reports of use of excessive force against civilians and 
death under police custody due to torture (e.g. Chebaane 2019). Kimball (2019) writes that in 
light of the country’s democratic opening, the police created their first union, the National 
Syndicate of Internal Security Forces, SNFSI (2019). While this is justified as a way for the 
police to improve their working conditions and security, many Tunisians are skeptical and 
think that this is one of the ways that the police are trying to cover their tracks and their 
history of abuse and continued impunity (Kimball 2019).  
In 2014, the then-president Moncef Marzouki launched the Truth and Dignity 
Commission (the IVD) to investigate state violations since 1955 (UNDP 2014). Fida 
Figure 1. willis from tunis (2018) 
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Hammami, a Tunisian researcher at Amnesty International, reports that “police unions have 
also been very hostile to the IVD [which] summons officers that might be involved in cases 
they’re investigating. [The unions] have encouraged their members not to cooperate” 
(Kimball 2019). The police state, however, is not the only aspect of pre-2011 Tunisia that 
has remained largely intact. This paper follows a bottom-up approach by centering citizens’ 
interactions with the state and its institutions, specifically in the way that they approach 
service provisions and acquiring benefits. This means looking at the most common way that 
services are provided: connections, or wasta. As will be argued later, violence is not the only 
way that obedience is enforced. I conclude that wasta is one of the ways that the state 
exercises power even when it doesn’t do so through physical threat. 
What is Wasta? 
Hans Wehr (1993) defines wasta as “mediator, intermediary, medium, expedient” 
(1067). It was originally used to describe those who mediate conflict at the family, 
communal, or wider tribal level (Lackner 2016). Also referred to as ‘vitamin waw’7, wasta has 
no exact translation in English which explains the wide use of the Arabic loan word. Lackner 
(2016) lists the following terms that are often used to refer to wasta in the Anglophone 
world, “patronage, nepotism, touting, brokerage, rent-seeking, clientelism and cronyism, as 
well as gatekeepers and expediters” (35). However, as she rightly notes, this lack of a direct 
equivalent can potentially reinforce negative interpretations of the practice of wasta. In this 
paper, I argue that this actually contributes to several issues. 
7 This is used mostly in Levantine dialects of Arabic, especially Jordan and Palestine. ‘Waw’ is the transliteration 
of the letter و, or ‘w’, in reference to the first letter of the word ‘wasta’. 
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Wasta is too often seen as a ‘form’ of corruption (Anderson 2016; Sadi 2017; 
Ramady 2017). This isn’t necessarily true, as oftentimes no law is technically being broken 
(Doughan 2017). However, the implications of this lack of conceptual clarity involve 
inadequate policy responses that overemphasize legal reform at the expense of distributive 
justice (Doughan 2017).  
For the purposes of this paper, I use Lackner’s (2016) definition which captures how 
ordinary people understand wasta “the mediator uses his influence with a state or private 
provider to assist the other party in obtaining something which she/he may or may not be 
entitled to” (35). I add that wasta is often used to obtain that which the party is very much 
entitled to, but bureaucratic obstacles would might make too costly (money and time-wise). 
Doughan (2017) notes that wasta is not unique to the Middle East and North Africa. It has 
equivalents like blat in Russia (Ledeneva 1998), raccomandazione in Italy (Zinn 2001), pulling 
strings in the United States, protektzia in Israel (Danet 1989), Beziehungen in Germany, and 
guanxi in China (Nuijten and Anders 2007). In the Maghreb, the French term piston is much 
more common than the term ‘wasta’, but they are direct equivalents.  
Understood as such, wasta takes a much bigger significance than its more restricted 
applications elections or parliamentary politics. It can be applied to other areas as well, such 
as labor politics and the role of labor unions, banking and debt, and finally, bureaucratic 
services (e.g. renewing passports, IDs, obtaining birth certificates, construction licenses, 
access to public hospitals, etc.). I argue that these areas are central to the negotiation of 
power and citizenship, in authoritarian regimes and during democratization periods.8 
8 My discussion of wasta applies to administrations and the banking sector. I only suggest ways that future 
research can examine labor unions, because of logistic limitations that have to do with unavailability of data at 
this stage. 
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Why Should we Care? 
The significance of this issue goes beyond a mere intellectual exercise. The Middle 
East and North Africa, the Arab World, or the Near East, etc. is a region that is hardly 
afforded any cultural and political subtleties in the media and so in people’s imagination. It’s 
easy to stereotype and categorize such a diverse and dynamic region when researchers 
unsarcastically use terms such as “Arab corruption” (Warf 2018) to essentialize the so-called 
“Arab World” implying that some inherent trait makes their brand of corruption different 
from any other around the world. This leads to using metaphors of “endemic” infectious 
diseases that need a “war” to be “eradicated” (Yerkes and Muasher 2017).  
This paper seeks to disambiguate one of the most widespread phenomena in the 
Middle East and North Africa without further contributing to the ‘othering’ of a whole 
region. By historicizing wasta, we can understand that though it is ‘informal’, it has its 
internal rules and structure. Seen as a byproduct of the hybridization of colonial bureaucracy 
and a tribal, kin-based social infrastructure, wasta stands out not as an extra-legal practice but 
a natural evolution of colonial structures.  
Differentiating wasta from corruption does not seek to attribute a positive value 
judgement to wasta. It contributes to understanding the structures that ordinary people 
operate in. It also provides a better understanding of how citizens view their representatives 
and their political role. In other words, this paper’s ultimate goal is to fill the gap that the 
literature on corruption and political clientelism have neglected: democratization does not 
solve the structural inequalities in which wasta thrives.  
7 
Wasta in the Literature 
Wasta and Political Clientelism 
Political clientelism is defined by Stokes (2011) as “the proffering of material goods 
in return for electoral support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is 
simply: did you (will you) support me?” (2). This is clearly one of the ways that wasta can be 
understood—political wasta. The literature on political clientelism is vast and extremely rich, 
especially as it pertains to Latin America whose electoral politics rely heavily on vote buying 
and brokerage (Stokes 2011; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). This relationship typically 
involves an unequal exchange, which is both voluntary and exploitative (Stokes 2011). Early 
studies have established that the “cement” in this paradoxical relationship is a moral norm of 
reciprocity which prevents defection (Gouldner 1960). This applies to everyday wasta as 
well. How different are wasta and political clientelism?  
When it comes to the Middle East and North Africa, studies on political clientelism 
are few and far between. As widespread as wasta is throughout the region, this in not 
necessarily reflected in the literature on the Middle East and North Africa. Most works look 
at elite level wasta, or political clientelism. For example, in her seminal work, Lust (2009) 
argues that in authoritarian regimes, elections are hardly ever about reimagining the rules of 
the game. Legislative elections in countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt were held not 
for the purpose of negotiating democratization. All parties were aware that “elections are 
best thought of as competitions over access to state resources, or ‘competitive clientelism,’ 
and the candidates and voters alike recognize this” (124). This is a significant observation, 
especially as Lust’s arguments applies to MPs who enjoy invaluable perks like political 
immunity, allowing them to abuse resources and connections in complete impunity in the 
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absence of accountability mechanisms. It also explains why parties go through the trouble of 
becoming potential targets of autocrats when they are already aware that their cause is lost. 
Regardless, overemphasizing elite-level wasta draws attention away from “ordinary” wasta 
that happens within the bounds of the law, but which has far-reaching consequences. This 
view “from below” is needed to understand the viewpoint of “clients” who are seeking 
services they may not be entitled to or would be too costly (financially and time-wise) were 
they to follow standard procedure without the prior knowledge of a “patron” who would 
facilitate the whole process.  
Clients’ Point of View 
The bulk of seminal research on clientelism prioritizes elite perspectives (Benstead 
2016; Blaydes 2008; Gans‐Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014; Hachemaoui 2013; Liddell 
2010; Lust 2009; Piattoni 2001; Richter 2007). Clients’ perspective has received more 
attention recently in Political Science, however works in other fields such as Sociology and 
Anthropology have already tried to piece out why and how citizens (especially poor people) 
choose to engage in clientelistic relationships (Auyero 1999, 2000, 2001). Beyond political 
clientelism and vote-buying, there is hardly any research on “everyday” wasta in the Middle 
East and North Africa unless it is cast within a discourse of ‘fighting corruption’9 or 
examining political clientelism. 
More recently, some works have started looking at clients’ perspectives in clientelistic 
regimes. However, this is still restricted to electoral politics (Pellicer et al. 2017; Pellicer et al. 
2018) and studies are still surprisingly scarce. Again, Political Science remains behind on 
9 To the best of my knowledge. 
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looking at clientelism “from below”. As I argue later in this paper, this is due to a lack of 
methodological diversity which overemphasizes elite-level analysis at the expense of micro-
level interactions.  
The small literature that deals with wasta per se largely looks at it in the GCC as a 
problem of leadership and business management (Berger et al. 2015; Velez‐Calle, Robledo‐
Ardila, and Rodriguez‐Rios 2015; Amin Mohamed and Hamdy 2008; Smith et al. 2012; 
Loewe et al. 2007; Al-Ramahi 2008). While these insights are valuable for understanding the 
climate in which access to employment opportunities takes place, they fall short of 
explaining how the often well-connected, but unqualified, job candidates contribute to 
reproducing the power dynamics upon which authoritarian regimes are built. Studies that 
look at social categories such as class and gender within wasta are rare, one of which is Bailey 
(2012) who uses focus groups with Emirati women to argue that despite religious arguments 
against wasta10, gender and class intersect to doubly marginalize women from access to 
opportunities. This is an example of the “dark” side of wasta—those who are deprived of 
patriarchal and class privilege. 
The Case of Tunisia 
The surprising lack of work on wasta also applies to the case study at hand, Tunisia. 
The fall of Ben Ali’s regime opened the way for research that would not have been possible 
pre-2011. Political Islam has been a popular topic among researchers, asking questions about 
the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Kadlec 2016; Schwedler 2011; Cavatorta and 
10 In fact, Amin Mohamed and Hamdy (2008) have surveyed religious texts and argued that when people have 
negative attitudes against wasta, it is due to Islam’s condemnation of corruption. 
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Merone 2013; Lounnas 2016; Ghannouchi 2016; Dalmasso and Cavatorta 2013; Hamid 
2018; Rohr 2011; Ounissi and Marks 2016; Wegner and Cavatorta 2018; Wolf 2017) and the 
future of gender in an Islamic democracy (de Silva de Alwis, Mnasri, and Ward 2017; Cordall 
and Mahmood 2017; Sadiqi 2016; Moghadam 2016; Muhanna-Matar 2015; Khalil 2014; 
Badran 2013; Pruzan-Jørgensen 2012; Marks 2012; Gray 2012; Marks 2011; Coleman 2011). 
To be clear, these research questions are of utmost importance because of the fragility of the 
Tunisian transition and the need to investigate issues that had been impossible to raise 
before because it was too dangerous, people were too afraid to speak, or politicians were 
extremely untrustworthy because of their loyalty to the ruling party, the RCD (the 
Democratic Constitutional Rally). However, the trend is clear: everyday citizens’ experiences 
of the transition are understudied.  
Because of this gap in the literature, this paper aims to expand the literature on 
democratization and everyday politics by centering the perception of those seeking wasta as 
well as those providing it. As I will explain, outside of vote-buying, wasta in Tunisia is 
oftentimes reciprocal. The most precarious wasta scenario is not simply when someone has 
no connections to get around, but when they do not signal to their wasta that they can repay 
the favor (sooner or later).  
Methodology and Limitations 
In addition to using primary and secondary sources, this paper uses a mixed-methods 
research design. I rely on my deep personal knowledge of Tunisia to report typical wasta 
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scenarios. My fluency in Tunisian Derja11 is also helpful in surveying popular expressions 
that people use to refer to wasta. Using this selection of linguistic data, I make a 
sociolinguistic argument on the linguistic encoding of wasta and what the latter reveals about 
Tunisian everyday politics and the negotiation of power. In the last chapter, I suggest a 
research agenda that centers ethnographic data. This will be mainly based on literature on 
political ethnography. 
Because of lack of funding, in-person interviews were not possible. Several attempts 
to do phone interviews have failed because of time difference and general mistrust. This is 
unsurprising, considering the contested nature of wasta. Instead, I chose to have this fruitless 
experience inform my research agenda to argue for better ways that wasta can be studied. 
11 Derja refers to the colloquial language spoken in Tunisia. Its language status is still debated, with most people 
referring to as a dialect of Arabic. In this paper, I refer to it as a language because it violates the principle of 
mutual intelligibility when compared to Levantine dialects. 
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Part Two 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the widespread use of wasta in Tunisia as we 
know it is a result of the legacies of colonialism and post-colonial governments’ authoritarian 
policies that undermined kin-based structures in order to implement a modernist project.  
The Colonial and the Postcolonial 
In “Notes on the (Post)Colonial in the Maghreb” (2009), Hannoum argues that 
“colonialism has introduced and imposed its own webs of significance into the colonies and 
[shows] the conditions under which the colonized became caught in webs of significance 
that they themselves had not spun” (324). Hannoum presents what he calls “a preliminary 
investigation on how the colonial continues in the contemporary Maghreb” (325). He 
engages an anthropological critique of the discourse of both colonialism and nationalism. 
Through examples from the colonial historiography of the Maghreb, i.e. colonial knowledge 
as power wielding, the national elite, literary and cultural productions, and finally post-
colonial historiography, Hannoum deconstructs nationalist claims of regeneration after 
independence. Instead, he argues that a more fitting dichotomy is that of the pre-colonial 
versus the (post)colonial.  
Before the French colonized the Maghreb, they engaged in an enormous process of 
knowledge restructuring. Hannoum argues that before the introduction of the Arab Bureau 
(Hannoum 2008), a French colonial body which produced ethnographic and historiographic 
literature on the Maghreb in general but Algeria in particular, historical texts distinguished 
the Maghreb by a striking racial diversity: “Jews, Turks, Moors, Coloughli [descendants of 
Turkish fathers and Moorish mothers], Berbers, and Arabs” (326). French historiographic 
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literature produced texts that reduced the racial makeup of North Africa to a dichotomy of 
Berber versus Arab. Berbers physically resembled white Europeans, and as such they were 
depicted as primitive ancestors to the modern French come to the rescue—to unification. 
The colonial discourse “concentrated around the nation and used the opposition Arab 
versus Berber to demonstrate the impossibility of nationhood in the Maghreb” (328). Both 
Berbers and Arabs, nomadic by tradition, “cannot conceive of existence beyond the tribe” 
and so tribalism became a symbol for their primitiveness and backwardness. Nationhood, 
then, was the mark of modernity, civility, and national progress (Hannoum 2009).  
These categories apply to the introduction of bureaucratic processes into the 
colonies which created a conflict in the “native’” traditions. Traditionally, tribes were the 
dominant social categories, and tribe elders would play the role of ‘wasta’ in mediating 
conflict within their tribe or in relation to other tribes. Social interactions are, thus, extremely 
personal and a person’s biggest capital is their social standing. Antoun (2000) argues that 
tribal structures serve the purpose of forming trust and “accomplishing social goals” (444).  
Explaining the variation in family law conservatism in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, 
Charrad (2001) writes that Bourguiba12 sidelined tribe leaders upon independence from the 
French in 1956. He believed that their primitive structures and beliefs would hold back his 
project of a modern, progressive Tunisia. Admittedly, he was a centrist whose politics 
angered the more revolutionary tribal groups whose identity was antithetical to the colonial 
project (Christian, white, Francophone, rational, etc.). 
Accessing services, like employment, obtaining and renewing identification 
documents, and securing positions in training programs and such became standard 
12 Tunisia’s first president. 
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procedures. In theory, these services are impersonal and non-discriminating, yet approval is 
often acquired, or in most cases, expedited through wasta that is often family-based. The 
result of this structure is entrenched inequalities because of the margin that wasta allows for 
the abuse of social capital.  
The Evolution of Wasta 
Speaking in the context of the MENA region, Barnett et al. (2013) distinguish 
between what they call “old wasta” and “new wasta”: 
With old wasta, the tribal leader sought to gain an advantage on behalf of the tribal group so 
that wasta worked from top down. New wasta, while still yielding advantage for the tribal 
group, works from bottom up. Moreover, with old wasta tribal elders and leaders gained 
status and authority via their role as middlemen. This source of status and authority is largely 
lost with new wasta. (43) 
This distinction is important to understand how wasta changed with the evolution of  
tribes. In Tunisia today, it is easy to determine a person’s tribal belonging as well as where 
their ancestors originally came from just by knowing their last name. As such, it is common 
to refuse service to a person if the employee has personal prejudice against a person of a 
certain tribal ancestry. The employee might oblige begrudgingly, but the person seeking the 
service would most probably be dealing with the “dark” side of wasta—endless referrals, and 
the famous Tunisian response “come back tomorrow”13 or “the person in charge is out of 
office and will be back this afternoon”14.  
 أرجع غدوة 13
14 All parties involved know that it’s a decoy, and there is no point in coming back in the afternoon. 
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Is Wasta a Form of Corruption? 
Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. Corruption can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending on the 
amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs.” It also defines petty corruption as: 
Everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary 
citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, 
schools, police departments and other agencies. 
Based on this definition, it can be understood that this involves wasta as well. After 
all, it does involve abusing entrusted power and controlling access to basic goods and 
services. However, in this section I argue that wasta is different from corruption. 
Examining Tunisian Derja, I find that expressions that refer to wasta are often used 
in a way that does not differentiate between corruption and wasta. At a surface level, this 
could mean that Tunisians are so desensitized to corruption that their linguistic encoding of 
their worldview normalizes petty corruption. However, this section draws from 
Sociolinguistics and Pragmatics to argue that the casual everyday references to wasta give 
insight into how people think of power and access to resources.  
Linguistic Encoding of Wasta 
In Table 1, I present as selection of Tunisian expressions that are used every day in 
response to prompts that have to do with accessing jobs and services, followed by an 
analytical commentary on this data.  
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a. Table 1. Expressions in Tunisian Derja 
b. Original Translation 
(X) بعثني )فالن( .1 sent me
(X) كلمك عليا )فالن( .2 contacted you about me
 (I’m here for the (merchandise/service جيتك على هاك القضية .3
4. 
 بن عميست
A mix of French and Arabic: Ben-
Ammiste, a person who uses family 
connections. Could also be used to 
describe those who use wasta (either client 
or patron) 
 من غادي لغادي؟ .5
Literally “from there to there?”. Used in 
response to lack of respect to hierarchy, 
status, etc. 
كتاف)فالن( عندو اال .6 (X) has some robust wasta
النسيب .7 Son-in-law 
8. Une personne serviable
A hospitable person (reference to how 
well they respond to wasta) 
تفضل، مرحبا بيك في كل وقت .9 You’re welcome any time 
 الناس بوجوهها .10
I can tell from your/their face (e.g. this 
person looks/seems trustworthy) 
 القفة .11
Literally ‘goodie bag’ / colloquially: 
sycophancy 
This selection of common expressions used on a daily basis in Tunisia speaks 
volumes about how public servants, namely employees in state administrations (like the 
postal office, the municipality, police station, etc.), “perform” wasta. 
In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Goffman (1959) develops his ‘dramaturgical 
model’. This model is based on Melancholy Jacques’s soliloquy in As You Like It. In the 
famous opening lines, Jacques declares “All the world’s a stage / And all the men and 
women merely players”. Goffman argues, thus, that our public selves are continually adapted 
to fit the image that we want to project about ourselves and to fit the social setting of the 
interaction. The American Psychological Association defines situated identity theory as “the 
theory that individuals take on different roles in different social and cultural settings, so that 
a person’s behavior pattern may shift radically according to the situation and the others with 
whom he or she is interacting” (APA). Goffman’s concept of the performative self, which 
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builds on situated identity theory, can be applied in this case to understand the performance 
of wasta, specifically how employees in public administration play both the role of a client or 
a wasta, depending on who they’re speaking to. 
Based on the preceding selection of expressions commonly used to refer to wasta, I 
identify three central elements of wasta: announcement, respect for hierarchy, and 
reputation. 
Announcement of Wasta 
Wasta has its internal rules. Announcing it is of utmost importance. The first three 
expressions are the most common ones used to announce wasta, usually declaring the name 
of the wasta, or the mediator, that established this connection. Prior knowledge on the part 
of the employee is not always necessary. In fact, it depends on how close the mediator is to 
the employee. If their relationship is robust, they would trust that whoever announces the 
name of the mediator were indeed ‘sent’ by said mediator. However, if a wasta is not direct, 
or was established through another wasta, prior knowledge would be needed. This unspoken 
rule is established to protect against false wasta: citizen A could lie about their wasta in the 
hopes of having their service fulfilled.   
Hierarchy 
Respect for hierarchy is an essential element of wasta. This is due, not simply to real 
hierarchy within administrations, but to lower-ranked employees overstepping the limits of 
their influence to serve or refuse service. Expression number 7 is a classic example of a 
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wasta-type interaction where a citizen could offend a doorman15 by simply greeting them 
without sharing the purpose of their visit or who they are. In this case, the doorman’s 
situated identity projects a higher status than he actually has.  
If a citizen uses wasta to approach employee A, but the latter is out of office16, the 
service would be delegated to the person higher up (employee B) in terms of hierarchy. 
Rarely would it be a person of equal or lower status. Fulfilling the request also depends on 
the impression that employee B has of employee A’s, or whether or not there is preexistent 
conflict. Therefore, this can be the citizen’s lucky day because they could be accidentally 
referred to someone with bigger prerogatives, or they can have wasta backfire. Little 
attention is usually given to how urgent is the citizen’s need for the service is or to the 
principle of impartiality upon which bureaucracies are built. 
Figure 2 below represents the possible scenarios that could take place when wasta is 
in action. 
Reputation 
Wasta is highly personalistic and it is similar to the general understanding of 
clientelism as a contingent/reciprocal process. As Hicken notes, “the delivery of a good or 
service on the part of both the patron and client is in direct response to a delivery of a 
reciprocal benefit by the other party, or the credible promise of such a benefit” (291). In the 
case of wasta, more weight is given to the ‘promise’ of reciprocity. As such, a person’s 
reputation depends on how well they peddle connections and serve citizens who arrive to 
15 Men almost always are employed as doormen. 
16 As is often the case with administration employees, who are often “away on business” when in fact they 
could be on a cigarette break. 
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his/her office through wasta. Expressions 6, 8, 10, apply to this element of wasta. 
Expression 6, “(X) has robust wasta” reveals that people take pride in being well-connected. 
This in turn, contributes to the strength of their own ‘promise of reciprocity’ in the eyes of a 
patron. Expression 8 is indeed a major compliment any administration official can receive. It 
does not refer to hospitality in the typical sense of the word. Describing someone as 
‘serviable’, means they are likely to prioritize those who are backed up by wasta, at the expense 
of those who approach him/her with a meager form or application dossier in hand. Lastly, 
describing someone as ‘Ben-Ammiste’ carries the understanding that they are most probably 
receiving bribes for the service, not only responding to wasta for the sake of social capital.  
Figure 2. Common wasta scenario 
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Party Politics and Wasta 
The Political Economy of Wasta 
In her seminal book, The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia, 
Béatrice Hibou (2011) writes one of the most compelling works on the role of the banking 
sector in reproducing authoritarian structures. After 9 years of fieldwork, she writes about 
how interconnected all sectors are: banking, political discourse, and international 
organizations’ complicity in Ben Ali’s police state. 
She argues that contending with the explanation of the oppressive relationship 
between the people and Ben Ali as a vertical one based on the use of violence and coercion 
tells only part of the story. “No government is exclusively based on violence and 
repression,” she writes (11). Her aim is “to understand, over and beyond the most brutal 
repression, the modes of government and the concrete economic apparatuses of power that 
render constraint painless and even invisible” (9). 
In other words, the book shows how the regime is set up in a way that cultivates in 
people a ‘desire’ for integration into this system. This integration guarantees them social 
mobility and economic opportunities as they participate in the weaving of the “fiction” of 
modernization and economic security. Wasta, in this context, is one of the features of Ben 
Ali’s world that carries over from before 2011 to this day. Trying to decipher the workings 
of everyday wasta falls under a tradition of politics “from below”. It is an example of 
Foucauldian power relations: ambivalent, negotiated, and constantly contested.  
Because wasta remains a striking feature of Tunisian society, democratization could 
potentially exacerbate it. Before 2011, all wasta goes through the RCD and its members. 
 21 
Administration officials’ “situated identities” are of RCD-istes first, and citizens second. This 
created a thick barrier between political dissent and access to basic services. If the RCD 
learned that a citizen disapproves of any state policy, then the wasta ‘machinery’ 
automatically shuts its doors. Any “mediator” would be endangering their livelihood and 
their family’s if they helped someone with a political reputation. 
Hibou’s insights into the banking system show how it revolves around bad debt and 
normalizes it, and how every participant from politicians to businessmen to average citizens 
depend on it—in her words, “power by credit, life on credit” (183). The banking sector is 
deeply social: businesses get loans only if they have enough social capital, not according to 
objective economic metrics of risk assessment. In other words, the success of any business 
depends on how well they behave within the ruling party. Abstention is seen as dissent and 
so is punished the same way—exclusion. 
Change and Continuity 
Hibou’s study is even more striking when the banking system is examined, now, 8 
years after the fall of the RCD; no reforms have been put into place to change how loans are 
allocated. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the same mechanisms that she describes in 
the first quarter of this decade remain mostly unchanged. As she recounts, Ben Ali’s rule was 
associated with the Tunisian ‘economic miracle’, a myth he reinforced by constantly 
showcasing ad nauseam, both to the country and the world, several fabricated figures as 
evidence of economic prosperity. This ‘Tunisian miracle’ was consolidated through an 
official discourse of exceptionalism, modernity, and security17.  
17 For more details, see Amnesty International’s June 2009 report entitled “Tunisia: Behind Tunisia's 
'Economic Miracle': Inequality and Criminalization of Protest” 
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I argue that the survival of this myth of economic prosperity can be explained by the 
gap it fills: it responds to people’s aspirations and gives meaning to an everyday life of 
control and surveillance. And it rests on what Hibou calls a ‘security pact’ (181). She stresses 
that this ‘pact’ should not be understood as an exchange, it is rather  
The assurance of order and tranquility… the Tunisian authorities thus make it a point of 
honor to enumerate the benefits that they are bestowing on their middle classes, and it is no 
coincidence that speeches focus on precisely this dimension: growth annually rises to around 
five percent, fostering a real development in the country; nearly 80 percent of families own 
their own accommodation; cars are made more popular both by programs that provide 
purchasing aid and, in periods when petrol prices go up, by oil subsidies; electrification and 
water conveyance affect over 90 percent of the population; telephones are increasingly 
accessible, as is the internet; birth rates have fallen and demographic growth has been limited 
thanks to an active family planning policy; etc. the Plan is the main indicator of the pact’s 
effectiveness: as a technique of assessment, it attempts to order everything so that the 
objective of security can be attained” (183).  
Hibou’s book presents a rare analysis of Ben Ali’s rule in particular, and domination 
in general. It remains perhaps one of the best works on Tunisia, and not many interrogate 
power the way that her work does. It shows how every aspect of everyday life revolves 
around the ruling party. It is difficult, almost impossible, to do anything without being under 
the watchful eye of the party, whether real or perceived.  
What Hibou’s argument shows is that power can be reified, not through weapons, 
but through controlling the public and what they perceive as ‘normal’. How much can a 
“democratic transition” achieve in the absence of progressive structural reforms that could 
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perhaps make wasta obsolete? Without structural reforms (not simply legal amendments), 
the state continues to hamper citizen’s prosperity and perpetuate dependence on its wasta. 
Wasta After 2011 
The previous section attempted to go beyond the simple understanding of wasta as 
corruption and show how, even when following legal procedures, it can still be a way that 
the state imposes obedience. It also showed how at the lowest level of everyday interaction, 
power is reified through the need that it creates: in the case of wasta, it creates dependence 
on state officials, personalistic ties, and arbitrary fulfillment of basic services. This section 
asks: how much has changed since the fall of the ruling party? I argue that democratization 
caused a reshuffling of social capital and the end of the RCD’s monopoly over wasta, yet it 
has not addressed the root causes of wasta. 
I explain the persistence of wasta using French theorist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus. It is “a way of describing the embodiment of social structures and history in 
individuals. It is a set of dispositions, internal to the individual, that both reflects external 
social structures and shapes how the individual perceives the world and acts in it.” (Power 
1999, 48–49; emphasis added). The interaction between the social context and the 
individual’s internalization of it can make it exceedingly difficult to simply “shake off” 23 
years of autocratic rule and what it entails like fear, conditioned social relations, policed 
discourse, censored thoughts, threat of violence, and selective propaganda. 
In other words, complicated bureaucratic procedures combine with highly 
personalistic means to acquire services and create the most pervasive means of non-violent 
oppression: the administration. What makes it so pervasive is the fact that it creates demand. 
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Tunisians are so accustomed to using wasta that despite its drawbacks, it remains highly 
sought after.  
25 
Part Three 
Research Agenda 
Perhaps the lack of attention to wasta is due to the research methods commonly 
used in the Middle East and North Africa. In this section, I develop a research agenda that 
rethinks how we study wasta in a way that respects its internal logic.  
Surveys and Public Opinion 
The Arab Barometer is the most robust cross-national survey of the Middle East and 
North Africa currently in use. Its four waves have been heavily cited in Political Science 
research on the region to understand changes in public opinion over time. One of its 
strengths is the repetition of questions from one wave to another in order to observe trends. 
Unfortunately, this does not apply to wasta. In fact, the Arab Barometer rarely refers to 
wasta; and when it does, it is to ask whether or not and how often respondents used it. In 
fact, only two waves ever use the word ‘wasta’ or connections. However, all waves refer to 
corruption, bribery, and the government’s role in curbing both. 
Wave I was conducted between 2006 and 2007 in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. Only three questions mention wasta: 
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Waves II (2010-11; Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen) and III (2012-14; Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen) make no mention of wasta 
whatsoever. Finally, Wave IV (2016-17; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Palestine, Tunisia) asks only one question about wasta: 
Figure 3 Questions from 226 and 227 from Wave I 
Figure 4 Question 506 from Wave I 
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While I do recognize that these surveys applications can be limited in that they ask 
‘what’ but not ‘how’ or ‘why’, I suggest that they have the potential to reveal more insight 
about people’s attitudes towards wasta and their perspectives depending on where they 
stand: have wasta, don’t have wasta, client, patron, middleperson, administration official, 
citizen, man, woman, senior citizen/retiree, etc. Incorporating targeted questions about the 
identity of respondents could frame their perspective and give us a better view of how wasta 
is perceived depending on how much wasta a person has access to. 
Second, surveys can be developed as well as conducted in local dialects, bridging the 
gap between what researchers think they are signaling and what respondents are actually 
hearing. As mentioned earlier, a person’s attitude towards wasta can depend on where they 
stand, or whether they actively benefit from it. When the Arab Barometer asks about 
corruption or bribes, respondents can understand it as ‘wasta’ or the other way around. 
Making questions more specific could avoid misunderstandings and so, unreliable data.  
For example, interviewers could ask if interviewees think that forms and applications 
are reliable ways to get services, what means they use to acquire wasta, if wasta is direct or 
Figure 5 Question q213 from Wave IV 
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indirect (i.e. do they know their wasta directly or is it acquired through a reference), and in 
countries like Algeria and Morocco references to the army and the monarchy, respectively, 
can also be helpful in showing variation in the type of wasta, etc. Surveys can use more local 
terms to refer to wasta. While the word wasta is very common in the Middle East, North 
Africans can be more responsive to other terms such as ‘piston’, ‘aktaf’18, or ‘maarifa’19.  
In other words, I find that a phenomenon this widespread in the region should enjoy 
more probing questions, especially ones that center the respondent’s world view and their 
dialect.  
Wasta and Political Ethnography 
Perhaps the reason that surveys can only go so far in unpacking the politics of wasta 
is because of its political nature: admitting one uses wasta depends on which side of wasta 
they stand, the privileged or the dispossessed. Asking someone directly about wasta can 
cause ‘negative face’ (Goffman 1959) meaning that the survey respondent or the interviewee 
can feel embarrassed or questioned. In an authoritarian regime, they can get quite suspicious 
and fear persecution. In this section, I argue that because of the controversial nature of 
wasta, a better strategy would be to not interrogate directly and impersonally, but rather 
observe wasta as it unfolds.  
In Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power (2009), Edward 
Schatz writes in the introduction that ethnography can be understood in two ways. First, as 
participant observation, it can mean “immersion in a community, a cohort, a locale, or a 
18 Aktaf is often used in Tunisia. Its literal translation is ‘shoulders’, a metaphor that uses shoulders as a symbol 
for reliability. 
19 Maarifa (or maarif as well in Tunsiia) is commonly used across the Maghreb. It means ‘knowledge’, but is used 
to refer to connections. 
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cluster of related subject positions” (5). Second, ethnography can also refer to a “sensibility 
that goes beyond face-to-face contact … and [is] an approach that cares—with the possible 
emotional engagement that implies—to glean the meanings that the people under study 
attribute to their social and political reality” (5). In other words, studying wasta with an 
ethnographic lens has the potential to go beyond the first step of establishing the existence 
of wasta, its scope, and purposes. In fact, ethnography can unveil the meaning that clients 
ascribe to their position in social networks, to their motivation behind pursuing any means 
possible to exist within the “web of significance” (Hannoum 2009) that authoritarian 
regimes weave. 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to achieve three things. First, I surveyed the literature on 
clientelism and wasta and found a surprising lack of interest in wasta. Second, I tried to parse 
out the concept of wasta in its application to the Tunisian administration and bureaucratic 
structures to argue that the state’s interests (whether before or after 2011 and the fall of the 
ruling party) lie in creating dependence on personalistic ties to enforce discipline and state 
obedience. Finally, I develop a modest research agenda and suggest ways that Political 
Scientists can improve their research design to better suit the internal logic of wasta.  
The limitations of this paper lie in the lack of robust literature that it could have 
responded to. In this case, ethnographic data becomes even more important as first-person 
experiences are needed to open the way for more research into this valuable phenomenon. 
Research can then begin to dig deeper into gender dynamics in wasta. “Old wasta” was 
typically exercised by the patriarch of the tribe or family. We can investigate if this still holds 
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nowadays and whether or not women operate differently from men. What can this tell us 
about women’s negotiation of power and citizenship. In other words, “politics from below” 
is key to understanding the future of Tunisian politics. 
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